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Modern peace operations represent a challenge for the development of international human rights-
based standards for the use of weapons since such operations are both multinational and contain a 
number of armed components. The first such component, and the most significant, consists of 
peacekeepers who are military personnel drawn from troop contributing nations (TCNs); the second 
comprises police officers drawn from troop sending nations (TSNs); and the third is private military 
and security contractors (PMSCs), who work for companies specialising in the provision of military 
and security services, ranging from the servicing of equipment to the guarding of property, convoys, 
and detainees. PMSCs may be contracted directly by an international organisation or will operate 
under contracts with the TCNs/TSNs. These components will generally attract different forms of 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which they are deployed (the host State), 
pointing even more markedly to any international standards relevant to the use of weapons.  
 
This chapter will focus primarily on peace operations under the mandate, command, and control of 
the United Nations (UN); and then within such operations it concentrates on the military and police 
components.1 It makes reference to other types of multinational military operations under which 
command and control is normally with States, even though operating under a mandate from an 
international organisation. Such operations have been variously labelled  ‘peace support ?,  ‘stability ?, 
 ‘peace enforcement ?, and  ‘military enforcement ? operations. In other words the focus of this chapter 
ǁŝůů ďĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďůƵĞ ŚĞůŵĞƚƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hE ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞƌĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘peacekeeping ? forces but 
now form part of broader multinational ĂŶĚŵƵůƚŝĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƉĞĂĐĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
 
The chapter traces the development of peace operations from their inception as limited military 
forces in the 1950s to their modern form, which is not only multifaceted but appears, from the 
mandates being given to such operations over the last decade, to be more belligerent than their 
predecessors. Peacekeepers, even at their inception, have been given functions that are less than 
those of combat but more than law enforcement, but this chapter argues that this does not 
somehow place them in a legal no-ŵĂŶ ?s land. Instead, it posits that peacekeepers are normally 
subject to international human rights law standards when using weapons and, only exceptionally, 
when actively engaged as combatants within an armed conflict situation, to international 
humanitarian law (IHL) standards. The chapter examines the standards developed by the UN for the 
use of force and weapons by peacekeepers (and where applicable UN police), both at the doctrinal 
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level as found in Secretariat and other UN documents, and at the more practical level in the form of 
the Rules of Engagement (RoE) given to peacekeepers.  
 
The chapter then analyses the hE ?Ɛstandards, rules and practice in terms of their conformity with 
human rights law and, where exceptionally applicable, IHL. As well as the obligations on 
peacekeepers not to use weapons in violation of such international laws, the chapter considers the 
positive obligations upon the UN under human rights law to reduce as much as possible the 
occurrence of such incidents by: promulgating clear standards prohibiting the arbitrary use of 
potentially lethal force; undertaking adequate training of all armed UN personnel in weapons usage 
in compliance with human rights standards; planning peace operations so as to reduce the risk of 
arbitrary loss of life; carrying out independent investigation of any loss of life; and providing  
mechanisms of accountability including access to justice for the victims of unlawful use of weapons 
by UN peacekeepers.             
A. The origins and nature of peace operations 
 
Modern peace operations have their roots in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was essentially a 
development of the stifling and ubiquitous effects of the Cold War that started in earnest in the 
1950s. As such, peacekeeping was not envisaged in the 1945 UN Charter, but it was vital in securing 
the basic goal of the UN and regional security organisations, namely a minimum level of peace and 
security in trouble spots around the world. This initially resulted in very small UN forces in colonial 
and post-colonial conflict zones in Indonesia, Kashmir, and Palestine in the late 1940s, consisting of 
unarmed observers dispatched to provide the UN Security Council (UNSC) with a reliable account of 
the facts. An evolutionary process led, in 1956, to a fully-fledged, lightly armed but several thousand-
strong force (the UN Emergency Force  W UNEF I), deployed to secure the peace by acting as a buffer 
between formerly hostile nations, following the British/French/Israeli intervention in Suez.  
 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŶĞǁ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ĚĂǇ ƚŚŝƐ ŶŽǁ  ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ? ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ŝŶ hE& / ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ
classical principles of international law, in that it was based on the consent of the host State or 
States, and, even though it appeared to constitute military intervention, its respect for sovereignty 
was reflected in the neutrality of such forces. The restrictions on the use of force to defence of 
peacekeepers or their equipment meant that the trinity of peacekeeping principles of consent, 
impartiality, and non-use of force very much reflected fundamental principles of international law  ?  
of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force found in Article 2 of the UN Charter  ?  and 
located more specifically in Chapters IV and VI of the Charter containing the powers of the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC as regards the pacific settlement of disputes.  
 
The fact that the UNGA mandated the original force (UNEF I) is no coincidence, in that its functions 
reflected the views of the Non Aligned majority as well as traditional principles of international law 
that gave such States protection from intervention. However, peacekeeping subsequently crossed 
into the domain of the UNSC as part of its primary responsibility for peace and security under Article 
24 of the UN Charter. This has led to the possibility of a more coercive peacekeeper. Article 2 
(specifically paragraph 7) and Chapter VII (specifically Article 42) of the Charter both recognise that 
the UNSC has exceptional powers to authorise military enforcement action, which has led to 
peacekeeping forces being given more coercive mandates, particularly after the Cold War ended. 
Thus, while traditional consensual, inter-positional forces can be said to be constitutionally derived 
from Chapter VI of the Charter, those with Chapter VII elements are more properly based in Article 
40 of Chapter VII, which empowers the UNSC to demand provisional measures such as cease-fires. 
Coercive peacekeeping can thus be seen to constitute a method of enforcing that demand. Clearly, 
the different types of peacekeeping that emerged from the Cold War had varying implications for the 
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use of weapons, with more extensive, potentially lethal force being used by operations with Chapter 
VII elements in their mandates.  
 
The dialectic between consensual peacekeeping and its more belligerent variant was established as 
early as the second full peacekeeping force in the Congo in 1960 W64, and was repeated, with less 
success, in the force in Somalia in 1993 W5; and is currently back on the agenda as the UN struggles to 
implement the  ‘responsibility to protect ? ?  ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ŝŶ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?agendas, inter alia, ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽhE ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?2 In general, judges 
and jurists have still maintained that such mandates are compatible with the traditional principles of 
international law and peacekeeping,3 and therefore do not constitute full-blown military 
enforcement action on a par with the UN-authorised actions in Korea in 1950-3 and the Gulf in 1991 
(whose constitutional base in the Charter is Article 42 of Chapter VII), since they are not directed 
against the government of a State but against rebel factions, armed groups, mercenaries, Žƌ ‘ƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐ ?
(those non-State actors who seek to undermine the peace). Nevertheless, coercive mandates mean 
that peacekeepers can cross the line to become war-ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐŽƌ ‘ĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨIHL, 
sometimes causing confusion as to the legal status of peacekeepers who are traditionally not seen as 
legitimate targets. Indeed, attacks on them remain prohibited under the 1994 UN Safety 
Convention.4 In 1999, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) clarified the non-combatant status of 
peacekeepers even in situations of armed conflict, by declaring that they are to be viewed as or 
civilians under international humanitarian law unless and until they actively engage as combatants in 
an armed conflict.5 
 
Post-Cold War peacekeeping forces have remained largely consensual but have developed 
significantly from the traditional buffer forces of the Cold War in the Middle East (UNDOF, UNEF II, 
UNIFIL) and Cyprus (UNFICYP), evolving in the early 1990s towards complex civilian-military 
operations designed to build the peace as well as keep it, and including within their structure 
military, police, humanitarian, and other civilian elements. Arguably, the developing nature and 
function of modern complex peace operations reflect changes in international law, in which the 
prominence of external self-determination in the period of decolonisation and independence of new 
States has been replaced to a large extent by concerns for internal self-determination within existing 
States, while the protection and enhancement of human rights and human security (of individuals 
and groups) have supplemented the traditional concern for security between States. This has led to 
21st century peace operations being furnished as a matter of course with Chapter VII elements in 
their mandates, empowering them to protect the peace process and civilians under threat of attack, 
while still being based on the consent of the host State. Thus, the move towards greater coercion by 
UN peace operations has continued apace with the end of the Cold War though they are still distinct 
from military enforcement action taken by Coalitions of the Willing (CoWs). Such CoWs sometimes 
appear to function as peacekeeping operations, for example the NATO-led IFOR and KFOR 
operations: in Bosnia and Herzegovina (after the Dayton peace agreement in 1999) and Kosovo (after 
Serbian withdrawal in 1999). Although they have UN mandates, they operate under delegated 
command and control and, moreover, are equipped and mandated to undertake potentially much 
deadlier levels of force than UN-commanded and controlled blue-helmeted forces.  
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With the end of the Cold War, UN interventions changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with 
operations becoming multi-functional by combining peacekeeping with limited peacebuilding. The 
latter was usually centred on the holding of elections as the pivotal event between conflict and a 
stable State. Such operations were a mixed success, with a number failing because the electoral 
process did not engage factions sufficiently to prevent a fresh outbreak of fighting (for instance, in 
Angola in the 1990s). More integrated and extensive peace operations have emerged since the 2000 
Brahimi Report.6 Such operations combine peacekeeping with more ambitious peacebuilding; the 
latter consisting of much more than the crude introduction of Western-style democracy to an often 
alien environment. Given that such operations are often conducted in fragile or failed States, there 
has been a trend, examined below, towards enabling the military element of such an operation to 
use force beyond the traditional limited form of self-defence possessed by peacekeepers. 
 
Post-Cold War peace operations, where peacekeeping was combined with peacemaking under the 
principles of consent, impartiality and the limited use of force, started with the UN operation in 
Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989. In the early 1990s, the UN rapidly developed a multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding model, a number of examples of which were successful in achieving 
their more ambitious mandates, for example in Nicaragua (ONUCA 1989 W92); in El Salvador (ONUSAL 
1991 W5); in Cambodia (UNTAC 1991 W3); and in Mozambique (ONUMOZ 1992 W4), although a number 
struggled, most notably UNAVEM in Angola (1989 W97). 
 
In straightforward terms, such operations took the form of combined military/civilian missions, which 
supervised the end of the hostilities and oversaw peacebuilding including an election process with 
the aim of producing a stable State. The force consisted of a military component whose function was 
ƚŽ ‘ƐĞƌǀĞŝŶĂƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƌŽůĞ PƚŽŐƵarantee and maintain a secure environment in which the civilian 
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚǁŽƌŬ ?ďǇŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂĐĞĂƐĞ-fire, and by the cantonment or withdrawal 
and disarmament of factions as provided by the peace agreement. Mine clearance was also included 
in most. Second, a police element ?  ‘ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ? ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞ
maintenance of public order, through crowd control, general law enforcement, and by training local 
police officers. This was often accompanied by the development or reform of the judicial system. 
Finally, there was a sizeable civilian component consisting of both international governmental and 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) actors with political, electoral, human rights, and 
humanitarian functions. The political function included overall guidance in the peace process and 
help with rebuilding or developing political institutions. The electoral function included advice, 
education, monitoring, and verification of the electoral process. The human rights function consisted 
of promoting, educating, monitoring, and investigating abuses. Finally, the humanitarian function 
included the delivery of aid, the implementation of the right of return for refugees, and the re-
integration of former combatants.7 All of these elements are found and developed in complex peace 
operations that followed the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi Report. Such developments have 
ďĞĞŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ƚŚĞ Ɛƚŝůů ůĂƌŐĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
peacekeeping ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŵĂƚĐŚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘Đŝǀŝů ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐ ?ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů ?ŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞǀŝǀĂůĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ?.8 
 
The Brahimi Report outlined the three principal elements of UN peace operations to include 
peacemaking, peacekeeping as traditionally defined, and peacebuilding; namely, ƚŚŽƐĞ  ‘ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
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undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools 
for building on those foundations something ƚŚĂƚŝƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶũƵƐƚƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?/ƚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ
the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, strengthening the rule of law (e.g. police and 
judiciary, prisons); improving respect for human rights; providing technical assistance for democratic 
development; and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.9 
 
Probably with the unsuccessful mission in Angola in the 1990s in mind, the Brahimi Report 
recognised that free and fair elections are just part of a process of buildinŐ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
democratisation, the protection of human rights, and the development of civil society.10 A peace 
operation aims to develop a partnership with the local population and time is taken in developing 
political and civil processes. In ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĞĂƌůǇƉĞĂĐĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ŚĂƐƚǇĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽŽŬƚŚĞ ‘ƉůĂĐĞŽĨ
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐƵƚŽƌƐ ? ?11 Thus, there is no quick fix in which the international community 
supervises elections and then leaves, though there needs to be a developed exit strategy based on a 
clear timetable under which a stable government and society is formed. Once it is clear that the 
people have exercised, and are able to continue to exercise, their right of self-determination (which 
does not mean simply holding elections), and that secure institutions and processes are in place, 
then the sovereignty and independence of the people and the country should be respected and the 
operation withdrawn, unless a small residual operation is left in a more symbolic role. The problems 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH, 1995 W2002) and Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999 to date), in which 
civilian peace operations (supported by CoWs) have struggled to establish such conditions, are a 
salient reminder that these are ambitious projects. An essential element is that the process must 
engage the local population and ensure that they are the main stakeholders as well as the 
beneficiaries of the process.12 Fundamentally, the process should allow for the local population to 
shape the society, not for that to be shaped by outside actors.13  
 
It is in this complex, constantly shifting, and often dangerous environment that armed UN 
peacekeepers and police operate with the potential to (mis)use lethal weapons. Before establishing 
the relevant human rights standards in this regard, it is necessary to establish that human rights law 
is applicable to UN peace operations.   
B. The applicability of human rights law to peace operations 
 
International humanitarian law is applicable during armed conflict, and thus is primarily applicable to 
the in bello rather than the post bellum stage (with the exception of the law of occupation). It was 
thus applicable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led CoW, authorised by the UNSC to 
take necessary measures in Libya in 2011, though the application of IHL was qualified by the terms of 
the authorising resolution that ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚ EdK ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞĚ ĂƌĞĂƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ŽĨ ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ? ?14 If, however, violence persists or flares up in the post-
conflict phase and reaches the level of an armed conflict of a non-international character (defined by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ĂƐ  ‘ƉƌŽƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ĂƌŵĞĚ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚĂƌŵĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?15), then IHL applies to 
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University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 174. 
13
 ƵƚƐĞĞZŽůĂŶĚWĂƌŝƐ ?  ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůWĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘DŝƐƐŝŽŶŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚƌŝĐĞ ? ?  ? ?Review of International 
Studies, 2002, pp. 637, 638 W9. 
14
 UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011). 
15
 Prosecutor v. dĂĚŝđ, 105 International Law Reports, 1996, p. 488. 
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the parties to a conflict, and also to a UN peacekeeping operation if it engages as a party to the 
conflict. After much debate in the UN, this was finally recognised in a piece of UN internal law in the 
form of a bulletin by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) promulgated in 1999.16 
 
Thus, IHL does not normally play a significant role in a post-conflict situation, and it is the jus post 
bellum, more realistically aspects of general international law, human rights law, refugee law, and 
international criminal law, which together frame the work of a peace operation. In identifying such a 
body of laws regard must be had to the priority of ensuring that peace and security in a fragile State 
is established, maintained, and then improved. Improvement will, though, only occur if justice is 
recognised as a value and is nurtured and protected, not only by forms of transitional justice but also 
by recognising the basic human rights of the population, and the obligations not only of the host 
State, but those outside states and organisations involved in the rebuilding process.  
 
Richard Caplan, in discussing the normative basis of transitional administrations set up by the 
international community to establish societies in war-torn territories, admits that the UN Charter 
does not explicitly provide for such interventions, but asserts that they are readily implied within the 
confines of Chapter VII of the Charter, as essential responses to threats to the peace.17 Post-conflict 
peacebuilding reflects a primary purpose of the UN system  ?  to establish a peaceful State, in that a 
State that is peaceful internally is less likely to spread violence externally. A peaceful State is no 
longer solely about having an effective government that is able to extend its authority and order 
throughout the territory of the State, as this may lead to unaccountable and, ultimately, despotic 
government, which in turn will lead to unrest and international violence. Thus, the international 
community can ill afford to support rebuilding on the basis of effective government alone; besides 
which, international law, in the form of human rights and self-determination, demands that 
rebuilding occurs within these parameters. As stated above, the movement towards promoting and 
supporting representative and accountable governments reflects changes in international law, from 
supporting the external self-determination of a State (i.e. its independence) to strengthening internal 
self-determination within a State. This is sometimes described as the promotion of democracy  ?
indeed the UNGA uses this term18 ? but the content of the applicable normative framework reflects 
the promotion of self-determination and human rights, including the right to participate in elections 
and to hold public office, found in both the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),19 
and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),20 but also including core 
economic, social, and cultural rights derived from the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).21 
 
The primary obligation to respect and protect human rights is placed on the post-conflict State itself. 
Unless the State is already a party to international human rights treaties, its obligations at this stage 
are derived from customary international law covering those basic rights drawn from across the 
human rights spectrum  W the right to life, freedom from torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment; freedom from slavery or other similar practices; from discrimination based on 
ethnic, religious, racial grounds or on the basis of sex; freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; 
                                                          
16
 hE^' ?Ɛ ƵůůĞƚŝŶ ?  ‘KďƐĞƌǀĂŶĐĞ ďǇ hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ &ŽƌĐĞƐ ŽĨ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ >Ăǁ ? ? hE ĚŽĐ ?
ST/SGB/1999/13, 1999, section 1. 
17
 Z ?ĂƉůĂŶ ? ‘dƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶs ?ŚĞƚĂŝů(ed.), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, p. 363. 
18
 EŝŐĞů ?tŚŝƚĞ ? ‘dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ PĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ?ŝŶWĞƚĞƌ Burnell (ed.), Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, Frank 
Cass, 2000, pp. 74 W6. 
19
 Article 21. 
20
 Article 25. 
21
 ^ĞĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?^ŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƵůƚƵƌĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ?  ‘'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽŵŵĞŶƚ  ? PdŚĞEĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞƐWĂƌƚŝĞƐ
Obligations ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? )ŽĨƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚ ? ?hEĚŽĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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and basic due process rights (covering arrest, detention, and trial);22 as well as the rights to food, 
water, shelter, medicine (health), and basic education.23 Given that internal violence in the past may 
have been caused by the denial of group or minority rights, then as well as enforcing the principle of 
non-discrimination, the protection of cultural, minority, and other group rights is essential in the 
post-conflict State.24 
 
Once these basic rights are secured, the post-conflict State can look to become a party to the main 
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR and ICESCR, in order to realise the full range of human 
rights. If already a party to such treaties, the State Party may consider derogating from some of the 
derogable rights, as permitted by the ICCPR,25 but only if the life of the nation remains threatened by 
violence extending beyond the peace treaty. Recognising that a State can move over time from a 
basic regime of human rights protection towards a full regime allows that State, and the international 
community, to place initial emphasis on security without denying the basic principles of justice. 
 
In addition to having obligations not to breach the basic human rights of its citizens and other 
individuals within its jurisdiction, the post-conflict State has positive obligations to take steps to 
protect the human rights of those individuals from breach by third parties such as armed groups that 
are neither State agents nor under the effective control of the State. This very important principle 
was established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in relation to a number of Latin 
American  ‘dirty wars ? ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ?ďǇ ‘ĚĞĂƚŚƐƋƵĂĚƐ ? ?26 
 
dŚĞƐĞ  ‘ĚƵĞ ĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĞǆƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƌĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂtions, whose 
agents are present in the post-conflict State. These States and organisations must ensure that they 
act with due diligence to prevent as far as possible the violation of human rights, by, for example, 
protecting civilians within their control (for instance, in UN bases or camps, detention centres, and 
arguably, in their areas of deployment) from attack by private actors, or from other potential sources 
of physical harm such as uncleared ordnance. Furthermore, the UNSC has committed peace 
operations to protect civilians under existential threat in their areas of deployment.27 The duty on 
peacekeepers to protect in these circumstances is derived from UNSC decision irrespective of any 
applicable human rights obligations.  
 
Thus, UN agents and soldiers of TCNs have duties of prevention as well as duties not to commit 
violations of human rights. Though peacekeepers are acting extra-territorially, the human rights 
obligations of their sending States arguably even attach to them in circumstances where they 
exercise control over areas or over individuals.28 This principle was suggested by the Human Rights 
Committee in 2004 when it stated that parties to the ICCPR must ensure the human rights of persons 
 ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨĂ^ƚĂƚĞWĂƌƚǇĂĐƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ?ƐƵĐŚ
as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-
keeping or peace-ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?29 When the UN is in effective control of the conduct of 
peacekeepers (and it normally accepts that it is in such control in UN-commanded and -controlled 
                                                          
22
 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Seventh edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 
562 W4. 
23
 ^ĞĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?^ŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƵůƚƵƌĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ‘'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽŵŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?op. cit. 
24
 Article 27, ICCPR; Article 15, ICESCR. 
25
 Article 4(1), ICCPR. 
26
 Velasquez Rodriguez case, 1988 Ser. C, No. 4 (1988), §172. 
27
 Starting with UNSC Resolution 1265 (1999). 
28
 See European Court of Human Rights, Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, Judgment (App. No. 55721/07), 7 July 
2011. 
29
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31,  ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to 
the Covenant ? ?hEĚoc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), §10. 
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peacekeeping operations),30 responsibility for human rights violations lies with the organisation, 
while normally in CoWs authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII, responsibility lies with 
the TCNs.31 dŚĞƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƐƚƌŝĐƚĞƌƚĞƐƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>ĂǁŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĂĨƚƌƚŝĐůĞƐ
on the Responsibility of International Organisations 2011, namely that the organisations must have 
been in effective control of the conduct of state organs (such as soldiers or police officers) for 
responsibility to fall on the organisation,32 seems to have added a degree of uncertainty over what 
had been established practice. Even though there is meant to be UN command and control of peace 
operations, the fact that military discipline remains with the TCN, and that the government of the 
TCN will veto any controversial order, signifies that establishing that the UN is in effective control of 
specific conduct will be difficult. This issue will be returned to when considering the issue of 
accountability. 
 
Despite this potentially retrograde development, the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations clearly show that it is possible to 
attribute wrongful acts to the UN, and such responsibility is based on it having duties under 
customary international law including ones to uphold and protect human rights. As an autonomous 
entity, having international legal personality, the UN is recognised as having rights and duties under 
international law.33 Thus, human rights obligations in the context of peace operations have two 
potential sources: the treaty and customary obligations of TCNs and the customary obligations of the 
UN. 
 
The promotion and protection of civil and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights, is 
essential in developing fair and effective governance. Peace operations have to be careful to 
promote the different types of rights equally, and not see civil and political rights as a priority 
(whether for ideological or practical reasons). Only by so doing can the right to self-determination in 
both its political and economic aspects be protected. Of importance for the economic aspect of the 
right to self-determination are the tasks undertaken, in part, by peace operations of development 
and relief, which will include at the lowest level the meeting of basic needs (the fulfilment of the 
basic human rights to life, food, water, and shelter),34 and then the development of economic and 
social infrastructure. Clearly there is a danger of interfering in the choices a society might make 
about economic, social, and political development, so the local population should have a clear say in 
these ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ?  ‘dŚĞĂŝŵŽĨĂŶǇ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƐŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
ŚŽŵĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐ ? ?35 but should be to facilitate choices and decision-making by the local population. 
 
Requiring TCNs and organisations such as the UN, as well as the post-conflict interim government, to 
act in compliance with human rights is not an impediment to the achievement of security within a 
post-conflict State. A truly peaceful State can only be achieved by combining security with justice, so 
that priority can be accorded to peace and security in the transitional phase. However, by protecting 
                                                          
30
 Iain ^ĐŽďďŝĞ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶZĠŶĠ:ĞĂŶƵƉƵǇ (ed.), A Handbook 
on International Organizations  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? ' ? 'ĂũĂ ?  ‘^ĞĐŽŶĚ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ŽŶ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?hEĚŽĐ ? ?E ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?pp. 16 W19. 
31
 But see European Court of Human Rights, Behrami and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, 
Judgment(App. Nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01), 2007. 
32
 ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Article 7, UN doc. A/66/10 (2011). 
33
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174 at p. 178; 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 ICJ Reports 73 at pp. 89 W
90. 
34
 E ? ?tŚŝƚĞ ? ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐWƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶWŽƐƚ-ŽŶĨůŝĐƚ^ŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝŶE ? ?tŚŝƚĞĂŶĚ
D. Klaasen (eds), The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
2005, pp. 465 W6. 
35
 Challenges Project, Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination, 
ElandersGotab, Stockholm, 2005, p. 21.  
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core and non-derogable human rights in that phase, many of which reflect the need to establish 
security, the peace operation remains human rights-compliant. Thereafter, justice must form of part 
of the peacebuilding efforts of States and organisations, both by ensuring that past injustices are 
dealt with (thereby not endorsing blanket amnesties for example),36 and by respecting and 
protecting basic civil and political, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights of the population.  
C. Peace operations and the use of force 
 
Despite the growth in PMSCs, States seek to maintain a monopoly on the application of force so that 
both defensive and offensive military actions in the international arena are essentially taken by the 
armed forces of States, although if military enforcement action against a sovereign government is 
contemplated then UNSC authority is needed,37 even if undertaken by a competent regional 
organisation.38 When that authority is granted the armed forces of contributing State or States can 
use significant levels of force and armaments (evidenced, for example, by Operation Desert Storm 
undertaken pursuant to UNSC Resolution 678 of 1990), but when the mandate is for a peace 
operation the levels of permitted force are much reduced (and this is reflected in the lighter 
weaponry carried), although there has been a lack of clarity on this issue over the life of 
peacekeeping. 
 
Two reasons for this lack of clarity are suggested. The first is the fact that peace operations, despite 
ďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚďǇĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵdEƐ ?ĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘hE ?ĨŽƌĐĞƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘^ƚĂƚĞ ?ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐ
raises the question whether the UN has the same rights and duties as a State to act in self-defence or 
to take enforcement action. Doctrine has generally fallen short of this, initially at least limiting 
peacekeepers to a form of self-defence more akin to that of personal self-defence rather than the 
defence of a State or organisation. Arguably, however, peace operations should have wider rights to 
use force in pursuit of UN goals and to uphold UN and international norms though, because of the 
nature of peacekeeping, it will fall short of full enforcement. Interestingly, in 1993 ƚŚĞhE ?ƐKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨ
Legal Affairs (OLA) explained the right of self-defence in the context of peacekeeping as something 
belonging to the UN, not just for individual peacekeepers. According to this view, the right of self-
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ƚŽ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ƌŝŐŚƚ ĂůƐŽ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?39 
However, conceptually there is a vast difference between recognising that peacekeepers have the 
right to personal self-defence on the one hand ? ĂŶĚ ĞƋƵĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ hE ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƐĞůĨ-defence with 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐƵŶĚĞƌƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞCharter on the other. The K> ?Ɛstatement seems to go against 
hEƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ďƵƚŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞhE ?ƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇƐƵĐŚĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ is possible though it has 
not been put into practice. The second reason for confusion as to the nature and level of the force 
that can be used by the peacekeeping component of a peace operation is that it sits somewhat 
uncomfortably between a military combat operation fighting a clear enemy and an armed policing 
operation enforcing public order laws. This second reasons partly explains why the UN standards on 
the use of force (examined below) for the police component of a UN peace operation are much 
clearer than those for the military component. 
 
Historically the acceptability of a peacekeeping operation lies in the fact that it usually has limited 
objectives, normally helping to maintain a cease-fire and a separation of the belligerents, not by 
means of enforcement but by consent and co-operation. Hence, peacekeeping is stated by the UNGA 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping to be based on a trinity of virtues  ?  consent, impartiality, and 
                                                          
36
 Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009, pp. 88 W109; Anne-DĂƌŝĞ>ĂZŽƐĂĂŶĚyĂǀŝĞƌWŚŝůŝƉƉĞ ? ‘dƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ŝŶs ?ŚĞƚĂŝů (ed.), 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, op. cit., p. 376. 
37
 Article 42, UN Charter. 
38
 Article 53, UN Charter. 
39
 UN Juridical Yearbook, 1993, pp. 371 W2. 
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restrictions on the use of force.40 The restricted nature of the latter was established by the basic 
principles guiding UNEF I in 1956 ?/ŶƚŚĞhE^' ?Ɛ ‘^ƵŵŵĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚǇ ?ŽĨhE& ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚǁhile 
there was some margin for judgment on the level of force to be used by peacekeepers, they were not 
combat operations, and were limited to the right of self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ,Ğ ǁĂƌŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘Ă ǁŝĚĞ
interpretation of the right of self-defence might well blur the distinction between [peacekeeping] 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵďĂƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ s// ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŚĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƵƐĞĚďǇhE& ?ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĞŶĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŵĂǇŶĞǀĞƌ
take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with 
arms, including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions they occupy under 
orders from the Commander, acting under the authority of the Assembly and within the scope of its 
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?The essence is a prohibition on the use of offensive force in which the initiative would 
be taken by peacekeepers, thereby restricting them to defensive and reactive force.41 Although 
Findlay points out this was a somewhat retrospective construction of the rules governing UNEF,42 it 
has become UN doctrine, and was applied, at least initially, even to the UN operation in the Congo 
(ONUC), which was deployed in 1960 in very different circumstances to UNEF. UNEF was 
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ďǇ &ŝŶŶ ^ĞǇĞƌƐƚĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ůŝŬĞ Ă ƉůĂƚĞ-ŐůĂƐƐ ǁŝŶĚŽǁ ? ? ŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞ ŽĨ
ǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂƐƐĂƵůƚƵƉŽŶŝƚďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐĂĐƚŝŶŐĂƐĂ ‘ůŝŐŚƚůǇĂƌŵĞĚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŚĂƚĂůů
see and tend to resƉĞĐƚ ? ?43 
 
At its core the limited use of force available to peacekeepers means self-defence, interpreted 
ŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇƚŽĐŽǀĞƌĂƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƵƐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞŝŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨŚŝƐŽǁŶůŝĨĞ ?ŚŝƐ ‘ĐŽŵƌĂĚĞƐĂŶĚĂŶǇƉĞƌƐŽŶ
entrusted in [his] care, as well as defending [his] ƉŽƐƚ ?ĐŽŶǀŽǇ ?ǀĞŚŝĐůĞŽƌƌŝĨůĞ ? ?44 Beyond this there 
ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐůĂĐŬŽĨĐůĂƌŝƚǇĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽ ‘ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ?ŝƚƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ?ƐhE
Secretary-General Hammarskjold recognised in 1956, the wider the right of self-defence is drawn, 
the more blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action under Chapter VII 
becomes.45 In general, peacekeeping was acceptable during the Cold War because it was kept distinct 
from enforcement action. Such a limited military operation not only suited the veto-wielding powers 
in the Security Council, it also met with the approval of the Non-Aligned States. It is no coincidence 
that the major troop contributors to peacekeeping forces during the Cold War were smaller 
volunteer States drawn from outside the five permanent members of the Security Council and their 
immediate allies (with the exception of the United Kingdom in Cyprus). 
 
As has been seen above, even early in the development of peacekeeping, an exception to the view 
that limited peacekeeping force to a narrow concept of self-defence was to be found in the Congo 
operation (ONUC) of 1960 W64. In his first statement to the UNSC on the creation of ONUC, UNSG 
Hammarskjold stated that ONUC was to have the same basis and would operate in the same manner 
as UNEF.46 As Draper points out, however,  ‘ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ
essential nature and the tasks they were called upon to perform, the differences between these two 
United Nations Forces were so great that it could only be a matter of time before the precedents 
ĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚďǇhE&ǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀĞŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ŝĨŶŽƚŝŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ?to ONUC.47 dŚŝƐǁĂƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ‘true in 
ƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƵƐĞĚ ?ďǇKEh ?ĚƵĞ
                                                          
40
 Special Committee on Peacekeeping ?  ‘ŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞŬ ĞƉŝŶŐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂůůƚŚĞŝƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ?ZĞƉŽƌƚ ?hEĚŽĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 鄃? ? ? 
41
  ‘Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the force, report of the 
Secretary-General ? ?hEĚŽĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
42
 Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 22 W3. 
43
 Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War, Sijthoff, Dordrecht, 1966, p. 48. 
44 General Guidelines for Peace-Keeping Operations, UN doc. UN/210/TC/CG95, 1995. 
45
  ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽŶhE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 UN Security Council 873
rd
 meeting, Security Council Official Records, 1960. 
47
 'ĞƌĂůĚ/ ? ? ?ƌĂƉĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞŐĂů>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐhƉŽŶƚŚĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨtĞĂƉŽŶƐďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ&orce 
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to the formidable amount of force opposing ONUC.48 Draper does not see this change from UNEF as 
being as constitutionally problematic since ONUC had the backing on the UNSC, which has Chapter 
VII enforcement powers at its disposal (though these were not explicitly invoked by the Security 
Council), while UNEF I was the creation of UNGA and the UNSG.49 
 
ONUC used a variety of weapons including mortars, fighter and bomber aircraft, light armoured 
vehicles as well as rifles, light automatic weapons and bayonets, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
weapons.50 This use of force flowed from the resolutions adopted by the UNSC and UNGA, as 
interpreted by the UNSG. However, at the outset of the operation, UNSG Hammarskjold clearly 
ǀŝĞǁĞĚ KEh ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ĨŽƌĐĞ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ĂƐ hE& ?Ɛ ŝ ?Ğ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶa narrow 
conception of self-defence.51 Draper states that this was probably sufficient to justify the force used 
by ONUC when, at its outset, it was concerned with overseeing the withdrawal of Belgian troops, but 
was inadequate when its task became the elimination of mercenaries supporting the Katangese 
secession, who, in November 1961, were considered by the UNSC to be the main threat to 
international peace and security, a threat that could widen to drag in the superpowers.52 
 
ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨKEh ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƐĞůĨ-defence. In his 
first report on ONUC of September 1960, the UNSG referred to the problems for a highly trained 
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌŽĨƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝŶŐŚŝƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƌŝĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂhEƉĞĂĐĞĨŽƌĐĞ P ‘,ĞŝƐĂůůŽǁĞĚ
the right to use force in the last resort of legitimate self-defence. The troops are also compelled by 
the demands of non-intervention not to resort to military initiative in situations which would 
ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ĐĂůů ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ? ?53 All ONUC troops 
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƉƌĞƐƐƌĞůĞĂƐĞ P  ‘zŽƵƐĞƌǀĞĂƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌĐĞ ? /ƚ ŝƐĂƉĞĂĐĞ 
force not a fighting force. ?WƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂĐƚƐŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŽďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽĂůůƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁŚŝƚĞ
and black. You carry arms, but they are to be used only in self-defence. You are in the Congo to help 
everyone ?ƚŽŚĂƌŵŶŽŽŶĞ ? ?54 
 
It is possible, as ƌĂƉĞƌƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚ ?ƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŚŽƐƚ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚKEhhad freedom 
of movement throughout the Congo when combined with the right of self-defence would have 
justified ONUC protecting itself when asserting its freedom of movement in Katanga; bƵƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚĞůůŝŶŐ
example of the expanding nature of the right of self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ƉƌŽǀŽŬĞƐƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚĂƚ
ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƚŚĂƚƌŝŐŚƚŚĂƐǇŝĞůĚĞĚƵƉĂůůƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ? and the moment  ‘when it becomes 
necessary ? to mandate the force with CŚĂƉƚĞƌs//ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƵƐĞ ‘ĂůůŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŵĞĂŶƐ ? ?ƌĂƉĞƌ
also suggests that the line between peacekeeping and war fighting is not passed until the force 
ceases to react in a defensive way and starts to take the initiative, in other words it starts to enforce 
the peace. Once it starts to take anticipatory or pre-emptive military action a peace operation will 
need to be armed appropriately, beyond the light defensive weaponry it normally carries.  
 
Anticipatory action, Draper suggests, is often undertaken in wartime by military commanders, but 
could not be justified in conditions short of that.55 This might appear to contrast with the hE^' ?Ɛ 
'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ ƵůůĞƚŝŶ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚIHL applies when UN peacekeepers are engaged in 
enforcement actions or in self-defence, but only after making it clear that this applies only when 
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 UN Security Council 873
rd
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 ' ?/ ? ? ?ƌĂƉĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞŐĂů>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐhƉŽŶ t e Employment of Weapons by the United Nations Force in 
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 UN Press Release CO/15 (1960). 
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 ' ?/ ? ? ?ƌĂƉĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞŐĂů>ŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐhƉŽŶ t e Employment of Weapons by the United Nations Force in 
ƚŚĞŽŶŐŽ ? ?op. cit., pp. 400 W02. 
 12 
 
engaged as combatants within an armed conflict.56 Thus, it would not be the case that peacekeepers 
using defensive force outside a situation of armed conflict, for example, to protect a convoy or to 
confront spoilers engaged in low-level violence, would lose their non-combatant status. Thus, in 
most instances, even when using weapons, peacekeepers remain outside the laws of war, but within 
the scope of human rights law. Only exceptionally will they engage as combatants as they did in the 
Congo in 1961, and in some instances since the end of the Cold War, one of which (reviewed below) 
is the modern operation in the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO). 
 
By February 1961, the UNSC ǁŝĚĞŶĞĚ KEh ?Ɛ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇ ƚŽ  ‘ƚĂŬĞ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ Ăůů
appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangement for 
cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes and the use of force, if 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ƌĞƐŽƌƚ ? ?57 Initially, in the period after this resolution was adopted, ONUC 
responded using force as a last resort in a defensive way, responding to mercenary attacks against it, 
but then it had to cross the line into offensive action in order to achieve such a wide mandate so that 
ŝƚďĞĐĂŵĞ ‘ŚĞĂǀŝůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶŶŽƌŵĂůĐŽŵďĂƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂůůĨŽƌĐĞŝƐƵƐĞĚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶĞcessary 
ƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?58 At this point the laws of war (IHL) became applicable. The severest 
fighting, which led to the elimination of the mercenary elements in Katanga, followed a later UNSC 
resolution adopted in November 1961 that authorised the UNSG to take vigorous action, including 
force, to tackle the mercenaries in Katanga.59 
 
Despite modern moves towards allowing more offensive action to be taken by peacekeepers, there is 
a reluctance to move away from the doctrine of self-defence as being the basis for the use of force 
and weapons by peacekeepers. This remains the reality in modern peacekeeping practice.  
dƐĂŐŽƵƌŝĂƐ ? ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚǇ ƐĞůĨ-defence remains the prevailing practice, even with peace 
operations moving towards having coercive elements to protect the peace process and civilians, is 
that it makes them more acceptable to the host State and the factions within it.60 At the doctrinal 
level, however, the UN has expanded the concept of self-defence. The Brahimi Report did this by 
unequivocally extending self-defence from individual self-defence to defence of the mission.61 As 
Tsagourias states, ƚŚŝƐĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌĂĚƵĂůĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƐĞůĨ-defence in PKOs, from 
individual self-defence inherent to military personnel, to freedom of movement and defence of 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ?62 This is reflected in the 
hE ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƐƚ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ  Wthe 2008 Capstone Doctrine ?  that, while still 
distinguishing peacekeeping from enforcement action ? ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ  ‘widely understood ? that 
peacekeepers  ‘may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if 
acting in self-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ? ?63 However, the reality is that once self-defence is 
so-expanded it is no longer individual self-defence, but is a mandate that permits a certain amount of 
enforcement (of measures of the type envisaged by Article 40 of Chapter VII such as cease-fires), 
though short of full peace-enĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽĨŚĂƉƚĞƌs// ?hůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ŝĨƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ ?
right to use force was based solely on the inherent right of self-defence there would be no need for 
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the mandate of modern peace operations to contain Chapter VII elements.64 This does, though, 
nudge modern peace operations up the scale of coercive action from consensual peacekeeping 
towards military enforcement; peacekeeping largely remains at the lower end of this scale and thus 
within the remit of human rights law and not IHL.  
 
A common criticism is that peacekeeping, developed during the Cold War as a limited military option, 
has been used out of context and contrary to its limited functions, in more violent post-Cold War 
situations.65 Thus, it is important for the UN to clarify more precisely the nature and extent of force 
that can be used by peacekeepers, as well as the type of weaponry that can be employed; in other 
words, how far self-defence may lawfully be extended. Given that it is not an easy task legally, 
politically, or indeed practically to move from peacekeeping to enforcement,66 it is important for the 
UN to be clear on the levels of force appropriate to each, and to deploy the right type of force and 
equipment to meet to meet the force, or threat of force, deployed against it. The next section will 
show that it has done this to some extent, when looking at the RoE of modern peace operations. 
 
The argument for keeping peacekeeping distinct from enforcement is often strongest within the UN 
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨhEWZK&KZ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚin Bosnia (1992 W5) by Yasushi Akashi, the 
Special Representative of the UNSG for the former Yugoslavia.67 Akashi viewed UNPROFOR as a 
peacekeeping force with a narrow right of self-defence, and was critical of the UNSC in adopting 
Resolution 836, which required UNPROFOR to forcefully deter attacks on the safe areas, as making 
the UN the enemy of the Bosnian Serbs and, as the UNSG recognised at the time, as requiring a much 
larger force than the one deployed.68 Akashi argues that the peacekeeping force  ‘was faced with a 
peculiar situation: on the one hand, there was a strongly stated commitment by the Security Council 
to protect the civilian populations in the safe areas, while on the other hand, none of the Security 
Council members, including those most supportive of the safe areas mandate and some of whom 
already had troops within UNPROFOR ?, were willing or able to provide the resources necessary to 
carry out the mandate.69 
 
/ƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨEdK ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂŝƌ ?hEWZK&KZ ‘ƉŽƐĞĚŶŽƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
it was a lightly armed peace-keeping force, equipped to use force only in self-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ? ?70 The UNSC 
arguably added to this perception by framing the mandate as a form of self-defence: defence of the 
safe areas. Akashi argues strongly for the separation of Chapter VI peacekeeping where self-defence 
is a personal one beyond which defence of mandate action should be exceptional, and enforcement 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌŚĂƉƚĞƌs// ?dŚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽĐƌĞĞƉ ? ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚĞ ? )ĨƌŽŵŚĂƉƚĞƌs/ƚŽŚĂƉƚĞƌs// ?ŝĨ
extensive coercion is required then, he argues, a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation should be 
withdrawn and replaced with a Chapter VII-authorised CoW equipped with a coercive mandate and 
weapons to match.71 
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While UNEF I was based on personal self-defence, as we have seen ONUC was not, at least after a 
time. However, UN doctrine did not then fully return to personal self-defence. In the case of the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), UNSG U Thant stated in 1964 that self-defence could be 
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚǁŚĞƌĞ P ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚďǇďŽƚŚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŽƌ ?ĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚƚŽ
be violated, thus riƐŬŝŶŐ Ă ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞŽĨ ĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ŽƌĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŝŶŐ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŽƌĚĞƌ  ?  ?ŽƌǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ
were] attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their 
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ ? ?72 Thus, force could be used in response to efforts, or anticipated attempts, to stop 
peacekeepers carrying out their responsibilities (thus introducing an element of anticipatory 
action).73 This was reinforced by UNSG Waldheim in 1973 in the context of the creation of UNEF II, 
ǁŚĞŶŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐĞůĨ-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent 
ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ĚƵƚŝĞƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?74 Although this 
seemed to raise the prospect of a widely drawn mandate giving rise to action in defence of mission, 
in practice RoE were interpreted quite conservatively.75 dŚĞ  ‘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ĐƌŽƐƐĞĚ
the end of the Cold War evidenced by UNSG Boutros-Ghali ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐŽĨ
engagement allow [peacekeepers to open fire] if armed persons attempt by force to prevent them 
ĨƌŽŵ ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?76 As Cox explains, however, although these interpretations of the 
right of self-defence come very close to enforcement, commanders on the ground have, until more 
recent times, been conservative in their interpretation of their mandates in order to ensure the 
continued impartiality of the UN, thereby attempting to secure the cooperation of the parties.77 
 
Recent, post-Brahimi mandates, though, require peacekeepers to defend third parties as well as the 
ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ? ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ƚŽ ƐĞůĨ-defence. 
Add to this the growth of the various UN agendas aimed at protecting civilians from existential 
threats,78 then pressure is on peacekeepers actively, and coercively where necessary, to use force to 
protect civilians under attack or under threat of attack. Given that peacekeeping is more than a 
police force but less than an army, it is not surprising that it appears to be ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ  ‘hE
peacekeeping missions, the right of self-defence of armed peacekeepers is somewhat wider than 
self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĨŝĞůĚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ?79 Cox agrees that self-defence when considered in 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵŝƚƐƵƐƵĂůůĞŐĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ‘/ŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĂƌƌŽǁĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐ
taken: force should only be used in defense of the peacekeeping operation itself and strictly in 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂŶĂƌŵĞĚĂƚƚĂĐŬ ? “ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐĞůĨ-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ? ) ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇĞǀŽůǀĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ŽŶĞ ?ƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ? ?80 which now includes protection of civilians within areas of deployment. 
 
The crucial issue of whether it remains possible to reconcile an expanded concept of self-defence 
with international human rights law, which, as has been established, is applicable to peace modern 
operations, will be considered following a more detailed consideration of when and how, more 
precisely, are peacekeepers directed to use force and weapons. 
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D.  Rules of Engagement (RoE) in UN peace operations 
 
When the UNSC ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞƐĂŽtƚŽƵƐĞĨŽƌĐĞ ? ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ) ?ŽƌŝĨŝƚĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉing 
force with the right to use force in self-defence and defence of mission, this does not in itself 
determine the use of force or weapons by the military operation. RoE perform a mediatory role 
between the mandate and the actual use of force by peacekeepĞƌƐ ?ZŽ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨǇƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƵŶŝƚ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝďůĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ? ?81 RoE 
 ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂƌŵĞĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĂƐƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĂ
peacekeeping operation mĂǇƵƐĞĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?82 In this way it has been argued that RoE are arguably more 
important than the UNSC ?ƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂů ůĞǀĞůĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞƵƐĞĚďǇĂ
peacekeeping component.83 ZŽĂƌĞƵƐƵĂůůǇŶŽƚ ‘ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐůĞŐĂůŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚ ?ďƵƚ
rather they reflect the law and thus are intended to ensure that military forces act within the law. 
dŚĞ “ůĂǁ ?ŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŵĂǇĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞďŽƚŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ?84 
 
Each ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐZŽŐŽǀĞƌŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞďǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ
Force (DUF) govern the use of force by any police contingent to the mission. Both are developed by 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. In 2002, the UN produced draft 
RoE,85 though their current status is unclear. Oswald, Durham, and Bates assert that ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĞŐĂů
ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ h& ŝƐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ? ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ůĂǁ ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ the  ‘legal framework for 
Ro ŝƐĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ŝŶƚĞƌnational humanitarian law and international human rights law.86 This 
analysis of the legal framework for the RoE of the peacekeeping component raises some concerns. 
The RoE of such forces should only reflect IHL if, and only to the extent, that they exceptionally 
become engaged as combatants within an armed conflict; and therefore normally should be framed 
by international human rights law. Though a systematic review of RoE is not possible, materials that 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ZŽ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ? ƉŽĐŬĞƚ ĐĂƌĚƐ ? ƚƌĂŝŶing materials, standards, and rules (reviewed 
below) all suggest that it is the case that RoE are largely framed by human rights law and, indeed, 
should be framed by such law and only exceptionally by IHL. Of course, if the mandate is for military 
enforcement action wherein the force will be engaged as combatants in an armed conflict then the 
framework for the RoE will largely be IHL, although it must not be forgotten that human rights law 
continues to apply during armed conflict.  
 
Though the UN produces RoE for each mission, the TCNs that send troops for particular operations 
will also give directives to their contingents to ensure compliance with their respective domestic law. 
The existence of dual instructions to troops may, as argued by Stephens, help to explain the gap 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚŝŶŐƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŽĨ ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŽƐĂŝĐ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇin situ which has it been properly resolved and, 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ Ăƚ ƚŚŝƐ  “ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ůĞǀĞů ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ? ?87 
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ĐŽŶƚƌŽů Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ? ? ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ
international RoE and laws remains strong with peacekeeping operations.88 He makes the case that 
on the issue of command at least, the distinction between UN-authorised CoWs and UN-commanded 
ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ŝƐ ůĞƐƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ ŵĂǇ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ? ŝŶĚĞĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ǁhich the force is 
deployed, the weapons carried and, to some extent, its actions all remain subject to single-state 
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?89 dŚƵƐ ?ŚĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĚĐĂƌĚ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇƉůĂǇĞĚďǇƚŚĞdEĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ ?90 or what he 
ĐĂůůƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉŚŽŶĞ ŚŽŵĞ ƐǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ? ? ŶŽƚ ƐŽůĞly as an issue of command but also of law, in that the 
national commander of a contingent will often have to check the compatibility of any order with 
national law  W  ‘ƐƵĐŚ ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝů ƚǇ ŽĨ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ůĞŐĂů
standards wŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶƐƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ZŽŽƌŽƚŚĞƌ “ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŐŽĂůƐ ? ?91 
 
Ɛ ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶƐ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ hE ZŽ ŚĂǀĞ ŵŽǀĞĚ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ƐƵĐŚ  ‘ďƌŽĂĚ
authorities haǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ  “ƌĞĂĚ ĚŽǁŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŐŝǀĞŶ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ
ĨŽƌĐĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ? ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚƵƐƐƵĐŚ ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĚŽǁŶ ?ŝƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ
ĂŶĚ ZŽ ƚŚĂƚ ĨůŽǁ ĨƌŽŵ ŝƚ ĂƌĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ůŝŵŝƚƐ ƚŚĞ hEĨŽƌĐĞ ?Ɛ Ăďŝůity to meet the threats 
against it.92 This is supported by Peter Rowe who asserts that UN RoE have no binding application to 
UK troops, who are subject to British criminal law.93 Thus, while UN RoE allow the use of lethal force 
to defend property in certain ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ĂdE ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁŵĂǇŶŽƚ ?94 This signifies that if a 
peacekeeper uses lethal force to defend property he will be subject to the military discipline of the 
TCN (there being no UN disciplinary system in any case), and may only escape punishment at the 
discretion of his national court if it accepts the argument that he was acting under UN RoE.95 
^ƚĞƉŚĞŶƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐďǇƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ŝƐĂ ‘ĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŵŽƐƚƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƵŶĚĞƌďŽƚŚhEĂŶĚ
national-issued RoE and sometimes there is a ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽ ? ?96  
 
The argument that national RoE prevail even in the face of Chapter VII mandates for peace 
operations seems suspect. One the one hand, the argument can be supported on the basis that UNSC 
decisions cannot, by themselves, override national laws sŝŶĐĞƚŚĞhEŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ƐƐŽĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƐƵƉƌĞŵĂĐǇ
ĐůĂƵƐĞ ? ŽŶůǇ ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƚƌĞĂƚǇ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ, and not national laws that are inconsistent with those 
arising from the UN Charter.97 On the other hand, Member States, including TCNs, are bound by the 
UN Charter (Article 25) to comply with decisions of the UNSC and therefore should ensure that the 
mandate is reflected in their instructions to troops. Although RoE themselves are not binding, they 
are based on decisions or laws that oblige TCNs to act in certain ways. Thus, on this basis, a TCN 
commander is faced with a choice between ŚŝƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁĂŶĚŚŝƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
obligations under UN law. It is not surprising that in these circumstances the TCN commander will 
choose national law. 
 
                                                          
88




 ZĂŵĞƐŚdŚĂŬƵƌĂŶĚŝƉĂŶŬĂƌĂŶĞƌũĞĞ ? ‘/ŶĚŝĂ PĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?WŽŽƌ ? /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ŝŶŚĂƌůŽƚƚĞ<ƵĂŶĚ,ĂƌŽůĚ
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In terms of human rights law it may be the case that if the TCN has fully incorporated its obligations 
under the ICCPR or regional human rights treaty (or both) into its national law, including its criminal 
and military laws, then the fact that the national laws and RoEs of TCNs are applied in peace 
operations will strengthen the application of human rights standards. However, it is arguably much 
more likely that a TCN will not have incorporated human rights law in such a way; and will apply 
largely unreconstructed criminal and military law to its contingents. Furthermore, it may not 
recognise the extraterritorial applicability of its human rights treaty obligations. Thus, in these 
circumstances, there may well be a conflict between UN RoE (which, giǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ hE ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ
rights obligations, should be based on international human rights law), and the national RoE of TCNs. 
 
Despite these problems, it is worth examining the mission-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘^ŽůĚŝĞƌ ?ƐWŽĐŬĞƚĂƌĚƐ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ
by DPKO, based on the mission ?Ɛ ZŽ ? ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ
international laws, particularly international human rights law. Given that UN RoE should prevail, it is 
important that they reflect human rights law.  
E. Human rights and the use of lethal force by UN peacekeepers and 
UN police 
 
The RoE of a peacekeeping force should reflect human rights law, and, if applicable, IHL. Given that it 
has been established that jus in bello plays a marginal role in peace operations, and that human 
rights law continues to apply during armed conflict in any case, this analysis is largely confined to an 
examination of whether RoE reflect applicable principles of human rights law, especially the 
obligation not to take life arbitrarily. Where IHL is applicable to peacekeepers, the prohibition on the 
arbitrary deprivation of life is qualified and combatants can  be targeted, although civilians remain 
protected unless  they take a direct part in hostilities.98 Applicable human rights law governing the 
right to life, for the purposes of this section, are those principles that can be drawn from major 
human rights treaties, and from treaty bodies and courts. Of course, all such law may not be directly 
applicable (for instance, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights may only relate to the 
obligations of some TCNs, and then extraterritorial jurisdiction also has to be established), but with 
increasing judicial dialogue between human rights courts, the standards identified are, in principle, 
applicable. 
 
Major human rights treaties make it clear that the right to life, though fundamental, is not absolute. 
Life cannot be taken arbitrarily.99 Doswald-Beck suggests that in order to understand when life is not 
taken arbitrarily a good starting place is Article 2(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which details when tŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ůŝĨĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ǀŝŽůĂƚĞĚ P  ‘ǁŚĞŶ ŝƚ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞ
which is no more than is absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƋƵĞůůŝŶŐ Ă ƌŝŽƚ Žƌ ŝŶƐƵƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? While (a) covers self-defence and 
includes within it defence of third parties, (b) and (c) go wider than the use of lethal force in self-
defence. Article 15(2) of the ECHR provides that the right to life is non-ĚĞƌŽŐĂďůĞĞǆĐĞƉƚ ‘ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ
ŽĨ ĚĞĂƚŚƐ ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ůĂǁĨƵů ĂĐƚƐ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ? ? dŚƵƐ, the ECHR provides some detail on when lethal 
force is permitted  W during peacetime and situations short of armed conflict when absolutely 
necessary for self-defence, to effect an arrest or prevent escape of a detainee, or in action taken to 
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 Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011, p. 161. 
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quell a riot or insurrection; and during armed conflict in accordance with IHL.100 This provides peace 
operations with a clear framework in contrast to the ICCPR, which (in Article 6) provides for a non-
derogable right not to be deprived of life arbitrarily, without providing any detail.    
 
Therefore, in traditional operations in which peacekeepers are restricted to self-defence, the use of 
permitted lethal force is clearly within the confines of human rights law. Furthermore, an 
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ŽůĚŝĞƌ ?Ɛ WŽĐŬĞƚ ĂƌĚ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ZŽ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ hE ĨŽƌ Ă ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ
operation  W UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005  W shows that in reality peacekeepers are still 
primarily operating from a basis of self-defence, though within that concept is now included the 
protection of civilians subject to the threat of imminent violence. As Article 2, paragraph 2(a) of the 
ECHR shows, defence of third parties is within the concept of self-defence, a concept also supported 
in the literature.101 The Pocket Card goes wider than indicated by the European Convention, by 
permitting the use of lethal force in defence of property, but in other ways, it is more restrictive, 
notably when it prohibits the use of lethal force to prevent the escape of any apprehended or 
detained person.  
 
The UNMIS Pocket Card states that minimum force and proportionality in the use of force are 
applicable at all times; that force must be limited in intensity and duration to achieve the authorised 
objective; and that it must be commensurate with the level of the threat. Deadly force is justified in 
some cases but force should be uƐĞĚ  ‘ŽŶůǇ ǁŚĞŶ ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ  ?ƚŚĞ ? ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ
aim, to protect yourself, your soldiers, UN or other designated personnel, installations, equipment 
ĂŶĚ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ŽĨ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ? dŚĞ  ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŽƉĞŶ ĨŝƌĞ ƐŚĂůů Žnly be 
made by order of the on-the-ƐĐĞŶĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ? ? ‘ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŝŵĞƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶĂŶŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?
 ‘ĞĨŽƌĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐĨŝƌĞ ? ?ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐŵƵƐƚŐŝǀĞĂ ‘ĨŝŶĂůǁĂƌŶŝŶŐĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚƌĞĞƚŝŵĞƐ ? ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶƌĂďŝĐ
ŽƌŶŐůŝƐŚ ? ‘&ŝƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞĂŝŵĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůed  ?  ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĨŝƌĞǁŝůůďĞŽƉĞŶĞĚŽŶůǇĂƐĂůĂƐƚƌĞƐŽƌƚ ? ? 
ĂŶĚ  ‘ŝĨ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? Ă ƐŝŶŐůĞ ƐŚŽƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂŝŵĞĚ Ăƚ ŶŽŶ-ǀŝƚĂů ƉĂƌƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďŽĚǇ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ Ŭŝůů ? ?
 ‘/ŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ ĨŝƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?; ĂŶĚ  ‘Fire for effect must not last longer than is necessary to 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ Ăŝŵ ? ? WĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ ĨŝƌŝŶŐ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŵƵƐƚ  ‘ĂǀŽŝĚ Žƌ ŵŝŶŝŵŝǌĞ ĐŽůůĂƚĞƌĂů
ĚĂŵĂŐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŚĞŶŝŶĚŽƵďƚ ?ĂůǁĂǇƐƐĞĞŬĐůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵŚŝŐŚĞƌĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ? ?
 
Subject to these conditions the Pocket Card allows peacekeepers to use force (up to and including 
ĚĞĂĚůǇĨŽƌĐĞ ) ‘ƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?ŽƚŚĞƌhEƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ?ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ,ĞĂĚŽĨDŝƐƐŝŽŶ
ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŚŽƐƚŝůĞĂĐƚŽƌĂŚŽƐƚŝůĞŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĂďĚƵĐƚ
the above people; to protect designated installations, facilities, and equipment from hostile acts or 
ŚŽƐƚŝůĞŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ‘ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐƵŶĚĞƌŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚůŽĐĂů
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŝŶ Ă ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƌĞŶĚĞƌ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞƐŝƐƚattempts by any 
person or group that limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, 
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶǁŽƌŬĞƌƐŽƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ,ĞĂĚŽĨDŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ‘,ŽƐƚŝůĞĂĐƚ ?ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŶ
action where the intent is to cause death, bodiůǇŚĂƌŵŽƌĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŚŽƐƚŝůĞ ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ ŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚƵƐĞŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ
which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is 
requŝƌĞĚ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞŝƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĞĚ ? ?&ŽƌĐĞ ?ĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚĞĂĚůǇĨŽƌĐĞ ?ŝƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ
the escape of any apprehended or detained individual; to prevent forcible passage of individuals or 
groups through checkpoints; and to detain those who effect forcible passage.  
 
Thus, the on-the-ground interpretation of the right to use force in peace operations shows a fair 
degree of caution as to when lethal and non-lethal force can be used, and although it goes beyond a 
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strict reading of self-defence, it falls a long way short of military enforcement action, and it largely 
complies with the obligation on States and the UN not to take life arbitrarily. Indeed, the UNMIS 
Pocket Card does not reflect Article 2(2)(c) of the ECHR that, when unavoidable, life can be taken 
when confronting riots and insurrections, which would cover the situations when a peace operation 
is faced with violence from non-State actors. Indeed, given the conditions that modern peace 
operations often find themselves in, where there are serious levels of violence but not of the 
intensity or duration for an armed conflict, the right to use lethal force when absolutely necessary in 
the face of such violence seems essential. In this regard, Principle 14 of the 1990 Basic Principles on 
ƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚ&ŝƌĞĂƌŵƐďǇ>ĂǁŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚKĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĂůŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚ
assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms only when less dangerous means are not 
practicable and only to the minimum exƚĞŶƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ? ?102 This should clearly be applicable to UN 
police but also to UN peacekeepers when they are undertaking riot-control functions. 
 
The main problem, in terms of human rights, compliance appears to be that the UN Pocket Card 
(and, therefore, presumably the RoE) allows the use of deadly force to protect UN property and 
equipment as well as to resist attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the operation. These 
appear to go beyond what international human rights law, at least as reflected in Article 2(2) of the 
ECHR, considers the circumstances in which lethal force is permitted. Penny considers the 
circumstances in which peacekeepers can use lethal force to protect property in some detail. He 
points to many instances where UN property, including weapons, have been threatened or stolen.103 
,ĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ ‘ŶĞĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽƵƐĞĚĞĂĚůǇĨŽƌĐĞ
in these situations; more precisely, they must be issued with and trained in rules of engagement 
(RoE) that cŽŵƉůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂǁ ? ?104 Penny focuses on the compatibility of UN RoE with 
international legal standards under human rights law, and he does not consider that Chapter VII 
decisions would override obligations on TCNs arising under human rights law (presumably because 
the issue is one of customary, perhaps peremptory, human rights law).105 Such issues must be 
interpreted in the light of the move from strict self-defence, to defence of mission found in the 
mandates of modern peace operations.  
 
In considering the right to life, Penny argues, on the basis of self-defence, that deadly force may be 
used to protect inherently dangerous property (such as weapons or munitions) that will present a 
threat to peacekeepers or civilians if taken.106 More problematically, he argues that for other UN 
property, which is not inherently dangerous  W vehicles, food, uniforms  W deadly force will only be 
justified if a proportionate and necessary response in defence of the mission. For example, theft of 
fuel would only justify deadly force if necessary to protect the mission. This would be the case, he 
argues, if the theft prevented the use of UN vehicles thereby endangering the lives of troops or 
civilians.107 While this might be acceptable in an armed conflict situation,108 under human rights law 
deadly force is not justified to prevent theft of mission-essential property such as fuel; and arguably 
lethal force is only allowed in the case of inherently dangerous property when necessary in self-
defence of peacekeepers or civilians, or as a necessary part of an action against riots or insurrections. 
Beyond that, the peremptory nature of the right to life cannot be overridden, even by a Chapter VII 
mandate, unless the UN force is engaged as a party to an armed conflict. In the case of armed 
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conflict, the legal regime is modified by IHL, so deadly force is permitted in circumstances when 
defending any mission property against enemy combatants, and arguably against civilians when they 
are either participating directly in hostilities or, when absolutely necessary in protecting property 
essential for personal survival or the accomplishment of the mission.109 
 
A contrast can be drawn between the RoE of a modern peace operation and the RoE of UN-
authorised military enforcement action by a CoW, illustrated by the pocket card given to US troops to 
be followed when engaging Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm under a UN mandate in 1991. The 
ƌƵůĞƐŽƉĞŶǁŝƚŚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůĞŶĞŵǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĂŶĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŝng the 
ĞŶĞŵǇŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐŵĂǇďĞĞŶŐĂŐĞĚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŶŝƚůŝƐƚƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶƐƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ
force against: those enemy combatants that are rendered hors de combat, civilians and their 
property (unless necessary to save US lives), and protected targets such as hospitals and churches, 
unless force is necessary in self-defence.110 
 
Thus, under the RoE in military enforcement operations self-defence is just one form of the use of 
force that is necessary, subject to the rules of jus in bello, to achieve the objectives of the mission 
(which in the case of Operation Desert Storm was to force Iraq troops and armour out of Kuwait).111 
Thus, there remains a qualitative difference between peacekeeping, its basis in self-defence (though 
increasingly widely drawn), and human rights law, on the one hand, and military enforcement actions 
on the other, with ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛemphasis on engaging the enemy as effectively as possible under the 
rules of IHL. The difficulty is that while the UN might not be willing or able (due to lack of volunteers) 
to take full enforcement action, it may be able to persuade States to contribute to a peace operation 
with a more coercive mandate, even though the situation may call for a more forceful response. Thus 
a peace operation may be put in a violent situation which, though short of armed conflict, may call 
for more coercive measures than allowed for in the concept of self-defence. In these circumstances 
human rights law should not be seen as condemning the peace operation to failure since, as has 
been seen, it can use force including, where necessary, lethal force to confront rioters and 
insurrectionists, terms that should be interpreted to include spoilers and armed groups that 
undermine the peace.  
 
Thus the hE ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚĞŶ ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ ĐĂŶ ƵƐĞ ĨŽƌĐĞseems to accord, with some 
exceptions, with the obligation on TCNs and the UN not to take life arbitrarily, but as the Human 
Rights Committee points out, the obligation on States, and by analogy the UN, is not only to ensure 
that their agents do not arbitrarily take life, but to take positive measures to protect the right.112 
Those positive obligations, drawn from treaty body practice on both law enforcement and military 
activities, are: ĨŝƌƐƚ ? ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĐůĞĂƌ ůĂǁƐ ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ůĞƚŚĂů
ĨŽƌĐĞ ?; second, adequate training of military, security, and police personnel to ensure they respect 
the law; third, adequate planning of any peace operation to prevent arbitrary loss of life as much as 
possible;113 and, finally, provision for independent investigation and, if necessary, criminal 
prosecution of violators.114 Access to justice for victims should also be included in the last obligation, 
including non-judicial avenues of redress. 
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In order for the UN to have fulfilled these positive obligations, the remainder of this chapter 
examines whether there is UN law governing when lethal force may be used by peace operations; 
adequate training of personnel in respect for the law; adequate planning of peace operations in 
terms of mandate, size and equipment (including weapons) to limit to the greatest degree loss of life 
(including the lives of UN peacekeepers, UN police and civilians); and automatic investigation into 
when life is arbitrarily taken by a UN peacekeeper and provision for access to justice for victims. In 
looking for evidence of these in the UN system, some mention will be made of weapons usage by 
peace operations, though there is very little detail on this in UN or other reports.  
F. UN law governing the use of lethal force and weapons by peace 
operations 
 
Although there is no specific UN law governing the use of lethal force or weapons by UN 
peacekeepers or UN police, a number of resolutions and other documents partly cover this issue. 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚ ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵŽĨŚĂƌĚ  ‘ƚƌĞĂƚǇ ? ůĂǁ ?ĂƐƐŽĨƚ ůĂǁĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵĞ
customary, although more realistically they can be viewed as pieces of internal UN law, some of 
which, though usage by the UN and TCNs, have gained the status of customary institutional law. 
 
It would be surprising if UN police weƌĞŶŽƚƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĂƐŝĐWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽŶƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚ
&ŝƌĞĂƌŵƐďǇ>ĂǁŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚKĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŐhth UN Crime Congress and promoted by 
the UNGA in 1990.115 As Doswald-Beck observes, this document has been frequently referred to by 
the Human Rights Committee in its observations on State reports.116 Principle 9 governs the use of 
firearms in the following terms: 
 
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or 
defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the 
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person 
presenting such danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only 
when less serious means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional 
lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life. 
 
Assuming this is the governing principle for the use of firearms by UN police, it is compatible with 
human rights limitations on the use of lethal force discussed above. 
 
A number of other documents cover the use of force and firearms by UN police. For instance, the 
KĨĨŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞhE,ŝŐŚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌĨŽƌ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ ?K,,Z ) ?ƐExpanded Pocket Book on Human 
Rights for the Police of 2004 provides that, in accordance with the 1990 Basic Principles, firearms are 
only to be used  ‘ŝŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ůĞƚŚĂůƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞĂŶĚĨŝƌĞĂƌŵƐ
ƐŚĂůů ďĞ ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ŽŶůǇ ǁŚĞŶ ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ ƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ůŝĨĞ ? ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ŝƚ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŵĞĂŶƐĨŽƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞďĞŵĂĚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ?ƚŽhE police, who 
shall receive training in this and the use of non-violent means.117 dŚĞ ? ? ? ?W<KƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶ ‘&ŽƌŵĞĚ
WŽůŝĐĞhŶŝƚƐ ?&WhƐ ?ŝŶhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐWĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŵĂŬĞƐŝƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ-specific 
guidance will be issued in each case to authorise FPUs to carry and use firearms, including the precise 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌĞĂƌŵƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝƚĞŵƐ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝĐĞĂŶĚ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? >Ăǁ
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ƐŚĂůů  ‘ĂƉƉůǇ ŶŽŶ-violent means before resorting to the use of force and 
ĨŝƌĞĂƌŵƐ ? ? ‘ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚŝŶƐƵĐŚƵƐĞĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŶƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
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 ‘ŵŝŶŝŵŝǌĞĚĂŵĂŐĞĂŶĚŝŶũƵƌǇ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂŶĚƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞ ? ?dŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐƚŚƌĞĞ
levels of the use of threat: passive, where dialogue is the norm; non-deadly threats such as during 
unlawful, but non-violent assemblies, where non-lethal means and weapons may be used where 
necessary and ŝŶĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶ
imŵŝŶĞŶƚ ĚĞĂĚůǇ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ Žƌ ŐƌĞĂƚ ďŽĚŝůǇ ŚĂƌŵ ƚŽ ƉŽůŝĐĞ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ Žƌ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ? ? ũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
application of lethal force.118 
 
W<K ?Ɛ WŽůŝĐǇ ŽŶ &WhƐ ŐŝǀĞƐ Ă ůŝƚƚůĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝů ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ ďǇ hE police in 
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂŶ&WhŵƵƐƚ  ‘ŚĂǀĞĂrange of weapons  W and the skills to use them appropriately  W in 
order to be able to escalate the level of force in a graduated manner, among them potentially less-
lethal weapons that are defined as devices used to stop, control and restrain individuals while 
causing less harm than lethal force to the individual as well as the police officer and any nearby 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ? ?dŚĞWŽůŝĐǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhEŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂ ‘ůŝƐƚŽĨƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞĚƉŽůŝĐĞĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ
FPUs, including similar technical specifications and numbers for firearms, shields, helmets, batons, 
ĞƚĐ ? ?119 
 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ‘ƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞ ?ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞhEĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
(UNDSS) directed at UN security officers and contracted security personnel responsible for the 
protection of UN personnel, visitors, and assets. For these individuals the use of deadly force is 
permitted in self-defence of themselves and third persons, to maintain order and security within UN 
premises and to prevent damage to them, to detain and prevent escape of a person who is a threat 
to security or who has committed a crime. Lethal force is only permitted for UN security personnel in 
self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ  ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ) ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ  ‘ŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ŽĨ ĚĞĂƚŚ Žƌ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ďŽĚŝůǇ
injury and therĞŝƐŶŽŽƚŚĞƌƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ? ?120 Again, apart from the possible use of 
lethal force to protect UN property from criminal damage, these guidelines are compatible with 
human rights law. Interestingly, the UNDSS guidelines ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘hE tĞĂƉŽŶƐ DĂŶƵĂů ? ĨŽƌ
 ‘ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ?121 but this document, which could 
potentially be crucial in identifying UN regulation of weapons usage, does not appear to be publicly 
available.  
 
Documents purporting to regulate the use of force and weapons by the military component of a 
peace operation  W peacekeepers  W are, surprisingly, less specific than for UN police and for UN 
security personnel ? dŚĞ W<K ?Ɛ  ‘,ĂŶĚďŽŽŬ ŽŶ hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ DƵůƚŝĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂů WĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ
OpĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ďĂƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞƚŽ ƐĞůĨ-defence with the fact that 
peacekeeping operations are based on consent. It provides that self-ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ
protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and other persŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌhEƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚ
does recognise that the UNSC can authorise an operation to use armed force in situations other than 
self-defence. Beyond that the Handbook leaves it to the mission-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐZŽƚŽ ‘ĐůĂƌŝĨǇƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
levels on the use of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should 
ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĂŶǇ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂǇ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ ? ?122 The 2008 
Capstone Doctrine expands somewhat on when potentially lethal force may be used, stating that 
ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŵĂǇ  ‘ƵƐĞĨŽƌĐĞĂƚƚŚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ůĞǀĞů ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
Council, if acting in self-ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ? ?  ‘ůůŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŵĞĂŶƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ
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include lethal force where necessary, may be uƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ‘ŵŝůŝƚŝĂƐ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŐĂŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƉŽŝůĞƌƐ
ǁŚŽŵĂǇĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƐĞĞŬƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽƌƉŽƐĞĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ
ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞƚĞƌ ĨŽƌĐĞĨƵů ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŝŵŵŝnent 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂƚƚĂĐŬ ?ĂŶĚ ?ŽƌĂƐƐŝƐƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐůĂǁĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?123  
 
These documents seems compatible with human rights principles on when lethal force can be used, 
identified above, if the provision on riots and insurrections is extended to situation to which 
peacekeepers are often deployed to include forceful actions against militia, criminal gangs and other 
spoilers who undermine the peace or threaten civilians. There remains the problem of using deadly 
force to protect UN property, which is generally difficult to reconcile with human rights law.  
 
At the operational level there are documents which purport to guide peacekeepers whatever mission 
they are on, in other words distinct from the mission-specific RoE. However, these are not helpful in 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĞŶ ĨŽƌĐĞ ĂŶĚ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ? &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?  ‘tĞ ĂƌĞ hE
WĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ ?ƉůĞĚŐĞƐƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŽŶŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŶĞǀĞƌƚŽ ‘ƵƐĞƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĂŶǇŽŶĞŝŶ
ĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞ ‘dĞŶZƵůĞƐŽĨWĞƌƐŽŶĂůŽŶĚƵĐƚĨŽƌůƵĞ,ĞůŵĞƚƐ ? ?inter alia, urge soldiers not to 
 ‘ĂĐƚŝŶƌĞǀĞŶŐĞŽƌǁŝƚŚŵĂůŝĐĞ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǁŚĞŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ?ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶǇŽƵƌ
ĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ? ?124 
 
While there are a number of UN documents (more for UN police than for peacekeepers) specifying 
when lethal force can be used, they are primarily concerned with redefining the notion of self-
defence. The detail is left to RoE for the military component of peace operations and DUF for the 
police element, arguably leaving a gap in which the UN should provide more precise, but generally 
applicable, regulations on when lethal force can be used. The key document is the 1990 Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which is viewed in the UN 
system as normative.125Although it may well have become custom, its terms are limited to UN police. 
Though some of its principles are also applicable to peacekeepers, there is a need for an equivalent 
document for UN peacekeepers. This document should still be based on human rights law, but 
should clarify when lethal force can be used against spoilers and other armed gangs. It should also 
ĐůĂƌŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ hE ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ hE ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚs 
standards.126 
G. Adequate training to limit misuse of weapons and the loss of life 
 
There is plenty of reference to adequate training of peacekeepers and UN police in UN documents, 
ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌƚŚĞW<K ?Ɛ  ‘WŽůŝĐǇŽŶ&ŽƌŵĞĚWŽůŝĐĞhŶŝƚƐ ?of 2009 provides that 
ƚŚĞ,ĞĂĚŽĨWŽůŝĐĞŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŝŶĂŶǇŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝƐ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ
in an FPU shall be well-ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĂŶĚĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝǌĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?h& ?/ƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ
training will enable FPUs to deal with difficult circumstances in line with a restrictive approach to the 
ƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞǁŚŝůĞĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ůŝǀĞƐŽĨĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ? ?127 For the military 
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component, W<K ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ,ĂŶĚďŽŽŬ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĚĞƐŝŐŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ŚƵŵĂŶ rights training 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ? ?128 
 
Analysis of UN documents on training reveals that for peacekeepers, according to a 1995 UNGA 
resolution, the responsibility to ensure that soldiers are properly trained, including presumably basic 
weapons training, falls on Member States, though the UNSG is requested to prepare training 
materials to assist those States in this regard.129 The development of training materials at UN level, 
and ensuring that TCNs use them, are both essential if the UN is to reduce the unevenness of training 
within TCNs, where it can be envisaged that left to their own devices there will be contingents with 
little or no training, some that are well trained in international humanitarian law but not in human 
rights law, and others that have comprehensive training programmes. 
 
The evidence is that the training of UN peacekeepers and police has become much more central to 
the UN in recent years. In 2007, the UNSG ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂ ‘ŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶ^ƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Capacity of the United Nations to ManagĞĂŶĚ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶWĞĂĐĞKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂWŽůŝĐǇ ?dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ
and Evaluation Division was created within the DPKO.130 This seems to be a positive development 
ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞĂŶĚŝƚƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ
aŶĚ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ? dŚĞ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ŵĂŬĞƐ ŝƚ ĐůĞĂƌ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨĂůů ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌǀŝĞǁ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ KĨĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS  W discussed further below).131 
 
Although these are positive developments, it is alarming that these feature in a report as late as 2007 
when complex peace operations date back to before Brahimi in 2000, to the early forces in Central 
America and Africa in the late 1980s/early 1990s. The prescription in the 2007 Report to the DPKO to 
ǁŽƌŬĐůŽƐĞůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ&ŝĞůĚ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?&^ ) ‘ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĞƐŽƵƌĐŝŶŐĨŽƌ
field missions, in particular in the areas of staff, equipment, training, security services and associated 
ďƵĚŐĞƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?ŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĂůƐŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞƐůŽǁŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞhEƚŽƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇŵĂŶĂŐĞhEƉĞĂĐĞ
operations. In the same document the statement that work by DPKO on the development of training 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ŝƐ  ‘ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ƵŶĚĞƌǁĂǇ ? ŝƐ ĂŐĂŝŶ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐing,132 but is indicative that such 
matters have historically been left to TCNs.  
 
Ǉ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞW<K ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇŽŶ ‘^ƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚWŽůŝĐĞWƌĞ-Deployment 
dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?Wd ?ĨŽƌhEWĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐǁĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞd by the DPKO that 
TCNs and any peacekeeping training institution should refer to in order to ensure that all UN 
peacekeeping personnel complete PDT, in accordance with the relevant PDT standards, prior to their 
deployment to a DPKO-led peacekeeping operation.133 Standards are posted on the Peacekeeping 
Resources Hub website as soon as they are available.134 In his report on the progress of training in 
peacekeeping of 2010, the UNSG makes it clear that Member States remain responsible for ensuring 
PDT (to UN standards) of uniformed personnel, while DPKO and DFS have responsibility for induction 
and ongoing training.135 
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129
 UNGA Resolution 49/37 (1995). 
130
 UN doc. A/61/858, §74. 
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An initial examination of these pre-ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ  ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ Ɛƚŝůů Ăƚ ĂŶ
early stage of development in that they do not appear to be precise, exacting requirements for all 
peacekeepers, for example by specifying when force can be used or weapons fired. Rather they refer 
to documents such as the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Roles and Training Standards for Military Staff 
Officers and UN Pre-Deployment Training Standards for Police Officers. The latter, for example, 
consists of a list of ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŽŶĞ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ Ă  ‘,ƵŵĂŶ ZŝŐŚƚƐ
^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝŶƚŚĞhƐĞŽĨ&ŽƌĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĂ ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚďƵƚƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ
ŵŽĚƵůĞ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ǁŝůů  ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ĐůĞĂƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ the human rights 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞĂŶĚĨŝƌĞĂƌŵƐďǇůĂǁĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?136 
 
/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞW<KƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘hEWƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŝǀŝůŝĂŶWd^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƵƌƉŽƌƚƚŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶ
a restatement of the existing norms governing the use of force by peacekeepers. On the one hand, 
these restate the rules on self-defence that have been identified since 1956; on the other, they then 
go much further than this when contemplating mandates adopted under Chapter VII. The document 
provides that all UN peacekeepers have an inherent right to defend themselves, if necessary, by 
using force, up to and including deadly force; and also that peacekeepers, authorised under Chapter 
s// ?ĐĂŶƵƐĞƐƵĐŚĨŽƌĐĞ ‘ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?ƉƌĞ-empt, and respond effectively to acts of, or imminent threat, 
ŽĨ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶǇ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŚŽƐƚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ďŽĚŝĞƐ Žƌ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?137 As a 
 ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ůĞĂǀĞƐ Ă ŐƌĞĂƚ ĚĞĂů ƚŽ ďĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ? ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐ ďƌŽĂĚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
when deadly force can be used ĂŶĚ ǁŚĞŶ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĨŝƌĞĚ ? ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ  ‘ƉƌĞ-ĞŵƉƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ?
Furthermore, though it is true to say that the impartial enforcement of a protection mandate should 
not distinguish between State and non-State actors who threaten civilians, the fact is that action 
against the government will constitute enforcement action rather than peacekeeping. 
H. Planning to reduce risk to life 
 
Training, no matter how comprehensive, will only be effective if there has been adequate planning so 
that the force deployed is capable of meeting the exigencies of the situation and environment it is 
deployed to. This is recognised by the 2008 Capstone Doctrine: 
 
The Secretariat has a responsibility to provide the Security Council with an accurate assessment 
of the risks associated with its decision to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and 




The realities of putting a peace operation together often result in peace operations that are, at least 
initially, inadequate for the task. An examination of the UNSG ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƚŽƚŚĞUNSC advising 
on the nature and extent of the operation for a particular situation reveals this. For example, in his 
report on preparations for UN deployment to the DR Congo of 15 July 1999, the UNSG makes the 
following prescient comment: 
 
In order to be effective, any United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, whatever its mandate, will have to be large and expensive. It would require the 
deployment of thousands of international troops and civilian personnel. It will face tremendous 
difficulties, and will be beset by risks. Deployment will be slow. The huge size of the country, the 
degradation of its infrastructure, the intensity of its climate, the intractable nature of some 
aspects of the conflict, the number of parties, the high levels of mutual suspicion, the large 
population displacements, the ready availability of small arms, the general climate of impunity 
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and the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory combine to make 




The failures of the Congo operation to protect lives are well documented.140 By 2001, a wholly 
inadequate UN force (MONUC) of 5,500 was unable to prevent horrific violence in the Bunia region, 
despite a mandate that contained a provision under Chapter VII, which enabled necessary measures 
to be taken to protect civilians.141 Indeed, a European Union (EU) force (CoW) was required in 2003 
to tackle the violence in that region. With the MONUC force struggling to maintain order, especially 
in the Ituri Province centred around the town of Bunia, the EU decided to send a 1,800 strong 
French-led force to that area, acting under a mandate from the UNSC.142 Although the operation was 
stated to be limited to humanitarian or crisis management within the so-called  ‘Petersberg tasks ? of 
the EU,143 the line between such operations and war fighting was not entirely clear, as evidenced by 
ƚŚĞĐůĂƐŚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶĚƌŝǀĂůŵŝůŝƚŝĂƐƐŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞhĨŽƌĐĞ ?ƐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐ
restored some calm, EU Operation Artemis was withdrawn on 1 September 2003.  
 
Another temporary EU force was sent in mid to late 2006 to support MONUC while elections were 
held in the country.144 These temporary deployments were only sufficient to quell the violence for a 
while and in the interim violence flared again despite significant increases in the size and mandate of 
MONUC.145 Ultimately, MONUC, which by 2010 had reached 20,586 troops, was involved in fighting 
rebels alongside government troops.146 It was replaced by the UN Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010 but still had a mandate to support the government in providing 
security and consolidating the peace, and in protecting civilians.147 To do this MONUSCO has used 
offensive weapons; for instance on 12 July 2012 the UN reported that the force had used attack 
helicopters firing rockets and missiles to deter the advance of M23 rebels towards civilian population 
centres in the east of the country.148 In these circumstances the UN is exceptionally engaged as party 
to an armed conflict of a non-international character and should be  applying the rules of  
international humanitarian law.. 
 
Possibly greater levels of force have been used by the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in 
Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a UNSC-authorised regional peacekeeping 
force,149 has fought alongside the Somali National Army against factions opposing the Transitional 
Federal Government, including al-Shabaab. Clearly, in these operations, the rules of IHL are more 
likely to be applicable, permitting significantly greater levels of force and use of weaponry than in 
normal peacekeeping operations. It is worth noting that AMISOM personnel received pre-
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deployment training in IHL in May 2012.150 Although official AU/UN reports on the fighting lack detail, 
it is clear that UN Operations in Somalia (UNISOM) forces were involved in heavy street-to-street 
fighting against al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in 2011 W ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂĨƚĞƌĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ?
were engaging them in open fighting where the greater firepower of AMISOM troops brought further 
military successes.151 
 
The weapons and equipment carried by each peacekeeping mission, whether UN, regional or ad hoc, 
will depend on the nature of the operation as well as the equipment brought to the operation by 
TCNs in agreement with the UN or regional organisation. In the Model Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between the UN and TCN to a peacekeeping operation, the TCN agrees to 
provide personnel and equipment in some or all the following categories: headquarters staff, 
infantry, engineers, helicopters, transport, military police, and formed police units.152 The MoU 
should be read alongside the Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Manual, which provides for TCNs 
to be reimbursed for troops and equipment. That manual lists the equipment that can potentially be 
brought into a peace operation and includes (on the police side): riot control equipment (including 
helmets, batons and shields), teargas, tasers, and police crowd control vehicles; while the military 
side includes: aircraft, machine guns, guns, anti-air missiles, anti-armour missiles, anti-tank grenades, 
howitzers, naval vessels, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers.153 There is no specific detail on 
weapons or munitions, though clearly aircraft and naval vessels, for instance, may well carry 
precision weaponry.  Some detail may be found in the UN Stand-By Arrangement System (UNSAS), 
which was launched by the UN in the mid-1990s in order to improve the rapid deployment of 
peacekeepers. In essence, UNSAS is a database of military, police and civilian assets that government 
have indicated are available for peacekeeping operations.154 
 
Clearly the level of weaponry will in normal circumstances be far less for a peacekeeping force than 
ƚŚĂƚƵƐĞĚŝŶĂƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐďǇĂŽt ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞhE ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶŽŶŐŽĂnd 
ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŝŶ ^ŽŵĂůŝĂ ĐŽŵĞ ĐůŽƐĞƌ ƚŽ ƐƵĐŚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? hE ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ĐĂƌƌǇ
weaponry that is illegal,155 or even indeed controversial. For example, in 2007, the use of rubber 
bullets by UN police was banned in Kosovo following the deaths of two protesters who were fired at 
by a Romanian FPU.156 
I. Investigation into use of weapons causing loss of life 
 
Proper investigation by the UN into incident where life is taken by UN peacekeepers or police is 
crucial, especially when considering that the UN and its agents enjoy functional immunity before 
national courts, while UN peacekeepers are normally, according to practice and the provisions of the 
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Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), subject to TCN discipline. With no real UN disciplinary system in 
place to punish individual UN peacekeepers or police officers, it is important for the investigation to 
be independent and to provide victims with access to justice and means of redress.  
 
In the case of UN police, the official commentary on the 1979 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
KĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝŶ ĞǀĞƌǇ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ǁŚĞƌĞ Ă ĨŝƌĞĂƌŵ ŝƐĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ? Ă ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŵĂĚĞ
ƉƌŽŵƉƚůǇƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?157 dŚĞK,,Z ?Ɛ ‘ǆƉĂŶĚĞĚWŽĐŬĞƚŽŽŬ ?ŽĨ ? ? ?4 provides a 
ůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝůŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨůŝŶĞƐŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇďǇƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŝƌĞĂƌŵƐ
ƐŚĂůů ďĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ ďǇ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ undermined by the next sentence 
ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐials shall be held responsible for the actions of police under their 
command if their superior know or ought to have known of abuses but failed to take concrete 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?158 The 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
provide that where injury or death is caused by the use of firearms a report shall be made to superior 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂŶǇ ‘ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇŽƌĂďƵƐŝǀĞƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞĂŶĚĨŝƌĞĂƌŵƐ ?ďǇůĂǁĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ
shall be punished as a criminal offence under the law of their sending government.159 Furthermore, it 
provides that: 
 
Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that an effective review process is 
available and that independent administrative or prosecutorial authorities are in a position to 
exercise jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. In cases of death and serious injury or other 
grave consequences, a detailed report shall be sent promptly to the competent authorities 




While there is some development of investigation and accountability for UN police, there are no clear 
avenues for victims to access to justice. As regards the military component of any peace operation, 
the system of investigation and accountability appears undeveloped and ad hoc. Yet it is here that 
greater loss of life of both peacekeepers and individuals (either from armed groups, spoilers or 
civilians) occurs. These are accounted for only briefly and factually in the UNSG ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽŶƉĞĂĐĞ
operations. An example given here is contained within a small extract from a 2006 report on ONUC in 
the Congo: 
 
On 18 January, MONUC deployed its Guatemalan special forces unit to the Garamba National 
Park following the receipt of information about the alleged presence there of LRA, including the 
militia leader, Vincent Otti, for whom the International Criminal Court had issued an arrest 
warrant. On 23 January, while approaching a militia camp, the MONUC special forces unit came 
under heavy fire by suspected LRA elements. Eight troops were killed and five were injured. The 
United Nations, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the international 
community mourn the loss of the eight courageous Guatemalan troops who gave up their lives 




In December 2005, a joint operation conducted by FARDC and MONUC against several hundred 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) elements in the Beni area resulted in the disintegration of this 
armed group; nearly 100 ADF combatants were killed and 14 camps destroyed. Furthermore, 
sensitization concerning the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and 
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reintegration process was successful in getting 97 Congolese members of ADF to surrender. 




Arguably, even in the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict, independent investigation of uses 
of lethal force by UN peacekeepers or police, as well as when the lives of UN personnel are 
themselves lost, is required. In conditions short of armed conflict such investigation is clearly 
required under human rights law. Within the UN system, this function is performed by the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which was established by the UNGA in 1994 to, inter alia, monitor 
and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of programmes and mandates; 
to conduct inspections of programmes and organizational units; and to investigate reports of 
mismanagement and misconduct.163 
 
dŚĞK/K^ ‘/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐDĂŶƵĂů ?ŽĨ  ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐhE police and contingent personnel 
(as well as contractors).164 Regarding peacekeepers from TCNs the investigative competence of the 
OIOS is limited as the following section of the Manual explains: 
 
OIOS authority to investigate conduct of contingent military personnel is limited by agreement 
with the [TCN]. Personnel provided by a [TCN] remain under the command of their national 
military commander. The overall operational authority for the troops of a peacekeeping mission 
lies with the Head of Mission and the Force Commander, but this does not include disciplinary 
measures for national military contingent members. Because [TCN] military personnel are under 
their respective national disciplinary authorities, the investigative methodology adopted by 




The Manual makes it clear that each dE ŚĂƐ  ‘ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƚŽ
investigate allegations of misconduct by its military personnel, but OIOS investigators may play a role 
if the TCN so requests, or if the TCN has failed to respond to a complaint, but such an investigation is 
subject to the national and military law of the TCC.166 In relation to UN police, the Manual provides 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘Ălthough United Nations Police officers are under the disciplinary authority and procedures of 
the Sending State, their signed undertaking includes the obligation to cooperate fully and actively 
ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ K/K^ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?167 Though this provides for some level of investigation, it does not 
appear to guarantee that every use of lethal force is investigated, as required by human rights law, as 
misconduct is defined in OIOS Guidelines as a failure to observe to rules of conduct or standards of 
behaviour of the UN.168 
 
In terms of access to justice for victims of unlawful use of weapons by peacekeepers, although there 
are a number of UN laws and practices on providing remedies, none of them specifically relate to 
human rights violation. The 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŐƌĂŶƚƐƚŚĞhEĂŶĚŝƚƐĂŐĞŶƚƐůĞŐĂůŝŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĚŽĞƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhE ‘ƐŚĂůůŵĂŬĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
ĨŽƌĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŵŽĚĞƐŽĨƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐŽƌĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐŽĨĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůĂǁĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ
to which the UN is a party.169 The 1990 model UN SOFA provides for the establishment of a standing 
claims commission for disputes or claims of a private law character,170 though in practice such 
commissions have not been created but claims have been settled through internal claims review 
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boards.171 The 1985 UNGA Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power172 ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ  ?ǁŚĞƌĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĞŶĂďůĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐƚŽ
obtain redress through formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and 
ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ? ? Furthermore, there has been considerable practice by the UN dating back to the first 
forces in 1956 and 1960 where the UN has paid compensation to third parties.173 
  
More relevant is the Declaration ŽŶ  ‘dŚŝƌĚ WĂƌƚǇ >ŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? adopted by the UNGA in 1998, which 
establishes a regime for dealing with claims brought by individuals covering, inter alia, personal 
ŝŶũƵƌǇ ? ŝůůŶĞƐƐŽƌĚĞĂƚŚ  ‘ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵŽƌĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĚƵƚŝĞƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐ ůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ
ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ? ?174 The lĂƚƚĞƌ ĞǆĞŵƉƚŝŽŶ ĐŽǀĞƌƐ ĚĂŵĂŐĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ  ‘ĨƌŽŵ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
actions taken by a peacekeeping force in the course of carrying out its operations in pursuance of its 
ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ? ?175 Nor does the resolution cover off-duty acts of a peacekeeper, which the OLA has 
explaiŶĞĚ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉĞƌ ǁĂƐ  ‘ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ Ă ŶŽŶ-official/non-operational capacity 
when the incident occurred and whether he/she was in military or civilian attire at the time of the 
incident or whether the incident occurred inside or outside the areĂ ŽĨ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?176 The 1998 
UNGA resolution also indicates that successful claims for personal injury, illness, or death will be 
compensated to cover economic loss such as loss of earnings, loss of financial support, and medical 
expenses, but not for non-economic loss, such as pain and suffering. A ceiling of US$50,000 for any 
claim was set.177  
 
Furthermore, the UNSG has accepted the responsibility of the UN to compensate ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ  ‘ǁŚŽ
ŚĂǀĞƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐůĞŐĂůůǇůŝĂďůĞ ?.178 The OLA has added that  ‘ĂŶ
act of a peacekeeping force is, in principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in 
violation of an international obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and 
its liability in compensaƚŝŽŶ ? ?179 As has been discussed, the UN only accepts liability when wrongful 
acts are attributable to it and not to TCNs, but this has normally been accepted by the UN in 
operations where there is UN command and control.180  
 
Are these principles and practices on access to justice and compensation in accord with human rights 
standards? Certainly the upper limit for payments and the refusal to pay for non-pecuniary damages 
is contrary to significant human rights jurisprudence.181 Furthermore, the absence of human rights 
violation as an express ground for complaint is outdated and does not accord with the basic 
principles of access to justice.182 
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Peace operations, though remaining distinct from peace enforcement by CoWs, are increasingly 
empowered (and sometimes required) to act coercively resulting in an increased use of weapons. 
International human rights law, along with general principles of international law, is applicable to UN 
peace operations, peacekeepers, and police. IHL is only applicable when the thresholds of 
enforcement and armed conflict are crossed. 
 
The legal framework applicable to peacekeepers is complicated by the unclear intersection of 
international and national laws and RoE. There appears to be no general acceptance that UN RoE 
prevail over national instructions, though if UN RoE are derived from decisions of the UNSC then 
TCNs are obliged to implement them. Besides which, uniformity in the application of lethal force by 
peacekeepers across TCNs can only be achieved if human-rights-compliant UN RoE prevail over 
inconsistent national instructions.  
 
When acting beyond their right to personal self-defence, peacekeepers are more likely to use force 
and weapons in a way that violates the right to life and other human rights. Although, in general, the 
UN principles and policies governing the use of force and weapons by UN peacekeepers, police, and 
security personnel are compatible with human rights law, the extension of the conditions in which 
force may be used by peacekeepers preventively, or indeed pre-emptively, becomes increasingly 
problematic in terms of human rights. 
 
UN laws on when force and weapons can be used need rationalisation and clarification, more so in 
the case of military personnel. Reports on the actions of AMISOM strongly indicate that clarification 
on the regulation of force in regional peacekeeping operations is also essential. Peace enforcement 
operations are mandated to use measures necessary to restore peace or tackle aggression, thus 
requiring significant levels of force and weaponry, which will normally be applied during armed 
conflict in accordance with IHL. However, current peace operations are normally mandated to use 
necessary measures to tackle non-State actors who endanger the peace or threaten civilians. While 
this may require greater levels of force and weaponry than deployed under classical peacekeeping 
operations, modern peace operations are not coercive enforcement actions, but remain consensual 
and largely act in reactive and defensive ways in conditions of instability or, sometimes, violence 
short of armed conflict. In these conditions international human rights law remains applicable and, 
moreover, can accommodate the use of weapons and potentially lethal force by peacekeepers where 
necessary in self-defence, defence of civilians, and in actions against violent rioters and spoilers.    
 
Training, preparation, and risk assessment prior to the deployment of peace operations is improving, 
but the development of clear standards by the UN is still unsatisfactory. Ensuring that TCNs provide 
proper training appears to be embryonic. In any case where life is taken by UN peacekeepers, police 
or security personnel, or where weapons are used which arbitrarily endanger life, there should be an 
investigation by the OIOS, independent of the TCNs, and accountability should ensue if human rights 
violations are found to occur. While there is considerable practice on compensation within peace 
operations, as well as developing UN law and doctrine on liability for death and personal injury 
caused by peacekeepers, access to justice is severely limited by weaknesses in investigations, the ad 
hoc nature of any accountability and remedial  mechanisms, and the absence of express remedies for 
human rights violations. 
